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COMMENTS
Apprendi and Plea Bargaining
Nancy J. King* & Susan R. Klein**
In his article JudicialFact-FindingandSentence Enhancements in a World
of Guilty Pleas,1 Professor Stephanos Bibas advances an arresting thesis. He
argues that the Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey2 backfires as
an attempt to protect constitutional values. His primary claim is that the
Apprendi elements rule3 will "hurt many of the defendants it purports to help
by ... depriv[ing]defendants of sentencing hearings, the only hearings they are
likely to have. By making important factual disputes elements of crimes, it
forces defendants to surrender sentencing issues such as drug quantity when
they plead guilty." 4 Professor Bibas does admit that the elements rule has the
countervailing benefit of a right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
maximum-enhancing facts at trial. He claims nevertheless that prosecutors can
easily circumvent this right by trying to prove an aggravating fact again at the
sentencing hearing under a lower standard of proof,5 and that most defendants
cannot afford to go to trial to take advantage of this right, because going to trial

* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, FedEx
Research Professor (2001-02), Vanderbilt University Law School.
** Baker & Botts Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
We thank Professors George Fisher, Jerold Israel, Daniel Richman, Kate Stith, and William
Stuntz for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this commentary.
1. 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. Professor Bibas calls the rule in Apprendi "an academic proposal that the Supreme
Court recently made into law." Bibas, supra note 1, at 1099. To the contrary, Apprendi
clarifies a rule that judges had considered to be law for nearly two centuries. The innovation
was the relatively recent enactment of statutes that keyed statutory maximum sentences to
judicial fact-finding at sentencing. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, EssentialElements,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1473-77 (2001).
4. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1100. "This is because a defendant who pleads guilty must
allocute to every element of the offense. Because enhancements are now elements,
defendants must allocute to them as well and are then estopped from relitigating the issues at
sentencing." Id. at 1152 n.338.
5. Id. at 1153.
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means losing points for acceptance of responsibility, 6 and risks perjury, 7
obstruction of justice, 8 recidivism, 9 and other enhancements under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 10
Thus, Professor Bibas concludes, the tragic
consequence of Apprendi's elements rule is that "it has strengthened [the
prosecutor's] bargaining position,"1 1 and "defendants on the whole will be
worse off." 12
This argument is indeed startling; it is also dead wrong. The prosecutor's
coercive power to force a guilty plea is not strengthened by Apprendi. Every
prosecutorial bargaining chip mentioned by Professor Bibas existed preApprendi exactly as it does post-Apprendi. Before Apprendi, prosecutors using
recidivism as a club could, and did, regularly insist that defendants admit
aggravating facts as part of the plea or face additional time. When the
prosecutor's threats of added time were not persuasive and the proof of
aggravating facts weak, the defendant prior to Apprendi could refuse to admit
to the aggravating fact, and plead guilty only to the offense without the
aggravating fact. Nothing about Apprendi gives additional leverage to the
prosecutor in this situation. A defendant who, prior to Apprendi, decided to
risk trial rather than face the aggravated sentence will make the same decision
after Apprendi. In fact, only one new bargaining chip is created in Apprendi,
and the Court gives it unequivocally to the defendant. By raising the burden of
proof, Apprendi makes it much more difficult for the prosecutor to prove
aggravating facts that trigger longer sentences. If the prosecutor couldn't
successfully convince the defendant to admit to the aggravating fact prior to
Apprendi, his chances of successfully convincing the defendant to admit to it
after Apprendi are lower, not higher.
As for those who would have pursued a guilty plea prior to Apprendi, they
are not "on the whole" worse off either. Consider the single example Professor
Bibas offers to prove his thesis: Al, the "typical federal drug trafficking
defendant with one prior felony conviction" 13 whose dispute with the
6. Id. at 1153 n.340.
7. Id. at 1154.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1153.
10. Id. at 1154.
11. Id. at 1160.
12. Id. at 1153; see also id. at 1151 (noting the "disastrous sentencing consequences of
the elements rule"). We address in this commentary the change, if any, in relative
bargaining power between defendants and prosecutors as a result of the Apprendi decision.
One could also argue that whether a defendant is advantaged or disadvantaged in plea
bargaining is not a legitimate criterion by which to judge the propriety of any given rule of
criminal law or procedure. For example, one response to Professor Bibas' claim that
defendants are generally made worse off by Apprendi is to point out that even if he is right
and defendants now may have to risk recidivism or other enhancements in order to litigate
guilt or innocence of aggravating factors, their prior ability to escape that risk was a
fortuitous windfall to which they were not entitled.
13. Id. at 1160.
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government concerns whether he is responsible for only the two kilos of
cocaine found on his person, or also for the additional forty kilos found on his
co-conspirators. Professor Bibas reasons that, before Apprendi, Al could plead
guilty to the drug offense without a plea agreement, 14 obtain his three-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the Guidelines, and argue
about the additional forty kilos at sentencing. If he wins, his guideline range
for only two kilos is 63-78 months, if he loses, he faces 121-151 months for the
forty-two kilos.15 After Apprendi all of this changes, according to Professor
Bibas. Proof of five or more kilograms of cocaine triggers an increased
maximum sentence making drug quantity an element of a greater offense. But
the greater offense also carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. Al
is forced to plead guilty to the greater offense involving five kilos or more and
be sentenced to the mandatory minimum 120 months, Professor Bibas argues,
because if he does not the prosecutor will file a prior felony enhancement,
bringing Al's mandatory minimum sentence up to twenty years. 16 Thus,
Professor Bibas concludes, "[t]he elements rule has cost Al the opportunity to
contest almost five years of his sentence." 17
This analysis is based on two faulty premises about bargaining behavior
before Apprendi. A prosecutor who knew Al was a prior offender and believed
that Al was responsible for dealing forty-two kilos would not have stood idly
by and let him escape with a five-year sentence for two kilos. He would have
done precisely what Professor Bibas predicts prosecutors will do after Apprendi
-threaten Al with the prior conviction unless he enters into a plea agreement
which includes an admission to all forty-two kilos.18 Every arrow Professor
14. Professor Bibas claims that some 25% of federal defendants plead guilty without a
plea agreement, though he gives no basis for this guess. Id. at 1159 n.359. We are inclined
to think that the actual incidence of straight-up guilty pleas without agreements is much
lower than 25%. One of us was a federal criminal prosecutor for the Department of Justice
for four years and never saw one.
15. Id. at 1161 nn.365-66.
16. Professor Bibas also raises the specter of a schoolyard, perjury, or obstruction
enhancement. Again, these enhancements were as readily available as bargaining chips
before Apprendi.
17. Id. at 1163.
18. Professor Bibas claims that "[m]ost prosecutors reserve these enhancements for
defendants who force them to go to a first trial." Bibas, supra note 1, at 1153. However, the
support for this proposition is his "understanding" of his own prior office's "unwritten
policy" of only filing prior felony enhancements when the defendant refuses to plead guilty.
Id. at 1153, n.342. He then directly refutes this by noting precisely the opposite policy
(filing prior felony enhancements in every case, regardless of plea) in another United States
Attorney's Office where a friend of his works. The policy described by Professor Bibas of
his former office would directly conflict with the official position of the Department of
Justice, outlined in the Thornburg memorandum, which requires that prosecutors charge the
most serious readily provable offense. Reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. REP. 347 (1994). This
memorandum was approved by the 1993 Reno Memorandum, reprintedin 6 FED. SENT. REP.
352 (1994), which continues to require that federal prosecutors charge "the most serious
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Bibas finds after Apprendi in the prosecutor's quiver to force allocution to an
aggravating fact was already there. In addition to underestimating the extent to
which prosecutors already used recidivism enhancements in bargaining,
Professor Bibas underestimates how routinely admissions to drug amounts
were included in plea agreements before Apprendi.1 9 Defendants who would
have had to admit to drug quantity as part of their plea agreement before
Apprendi are no worse off after the decision. For them, the door to the "second
trial" on drug amount was already shut. True, we have no more empirical
proof than Professor Bibas on these points, but we would wager that the preApprendi Als of this world-that is, defendants who are prior offenders and
who plead guilty to federal drug charges but manage to escape both prior
offense enhancements and admissions of drug amounts in their plea
agreements-are not as plentiful as Professor Bibas suggests.
Reliance on Al for proof that Apprendi hurts defendants is misleading in
other ways. The fact is that for many defendants Apprendi is a powerful tool.
Assume, for example an alleged drug offender, Bill, with no prior convictions
and against whom the prosecutor has solid evidence of two kilos, but weak
evidence of forty more. After Apprendi, Bill's attorney could tell the judge that
Bill stands ready to plead guilty to the charge involving two kilos, now a lesser
included offense, but will plead not guilty to the higher offense involving five
kilos or more. If the prosecutor insists on a trial of the higher offense, and Bill
admits the two kilos challenging only the extra forty, and wins, he still gains

offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, that is likely to result in
a sustainable conviction." These memoranda have been memorialized in the U.S.A.M. 927.400 (Sept. 1999) ("[C]harges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the
prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's ability readily to prove a charge for
legal or evidentiary reasons."). Regardless of what policy is actually followed in most
districts, prosecutors can threaten to file the prior conviction if the defendant refuses to
plead guilty to the higher amount.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 246 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2001) (defendant
stipulated to drug amount as part of guilty plea); United States v. Poulack, 236 F.3d 932, 934
(8th Cir. 2001) (same); see also FED. R. CRtM. P. l1(e)(1)(c); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.8(a) (2000) (presuming facts concerning the offense would be included in
the plea agreement); 8 FED. SENT. REP. (1996) (collecting articles addressing fact bargaining
under the Guidelines). Given that he underestimates the extent to which plea bargaining
already controlled sentencing before Apprendi was decided, it is not surprising that Professor
Bibas also overestimates the success of his proposed alternative. Professor Bibas argues that
the Court should have rejected the elements rule and instead reinforced the right to a "second
trial" at sentencing through the extension of discovery and confrontation rights. But shifting
the trial of facts to sentencing will not insulate those facts from the bargaining process, as
Professor Bibas seems to assume. One need not look past Professor Bibas' own comfortable
turf, federal sentencing, to see the inevitable result of enhanced procedural protection at
sentencing. Well before Apprendi, sentencing bargains and waivers of the right to appeal
sentences became commonplace. Boost even further the procedures at sentencing, and even
more revered "second trials" will take place by stipulation. Just as with the guilt phase,
heightened procedure at this second trial raises the cost of the process for the government,
creating an incentive to bargain around it.
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his three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.2 0 Moreover, because
the government must prove Bill's tie to five or more kilos beyond a reasonable
doubt and provide the full array of procedural protections not afforded at
sentencing (including the rules of evidence), Bill has a better chance of
winning on the higher offense.2 1 Sensible prosecutors will figure this out and

20. Professor Bibas notes that Al would receive his three-point reduction where he
pleads only to the two kilos and challenges the additional 40 at sentencing. Bibas, supra
note 1, at 1161 n.363. Professor Bibas also concedes that a defendant "might be able to get
credit for acceptance of responsibility" where the prosecutor allows him to plead guilty to
the two kilos and go to trial on the additional 40. Id. at 1164. In fact, a defendant such as
Bill would gain the entire three-point reduction, regardless of whether the prosecutor offered
a plea to the base offense. A defendant willing to plead guilty to the only crime he is
eventually convicted of shows all of the remorse contemplated under U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, 110 F.3d
647, 653-56 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding the trial court's refusal to grant three-point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility clearly erroneous where defendant offered to plead guilty to
drug offenses involving two kilograms of cocaine-prosecutor refused to accept plea unless
defendant admitted involvement with five kilograms and judge found defendant responsible
at sentencing for only two kilograms); United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 851-54 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 857 (1995) (granting defendant a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility even though he had already been convicted at trial where district court
thwarted defendant's attempts to plead guilty). Thus, after Apprendi, to get acceptance of
responsibility points a defendant has to offer to stipulate to all of the elements except the one
that triggers the higher offense, on the record or in writing, so it is clear that the only thing
he is contesting is the aggravating element. We predict that judges would not only routinely
grant such reductions, but would get irritated with prosecutors for sticking with a higher
charge after such an offer by a defendant, particularly if the prosecutor doesn't end up
proving the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.
However, the more important issue is not whether Apprendi presents difficulties for
defendants under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as written today, but as they sensibly
can be written. The Guidelines can be clarified and indeed changed to accommodate
Apprendi. Moreover, the wisdom of a constitutional interpretation such as Apprendi should
not depend on the current state of one jurisdiction's guidelines regime.
21. It is true that, in Bill's particular case, even after an acquittal on the 40 kilos, the
prosecutor can reargue the greater amount as relevant conduct at sentencing. United States
v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152-57 (1997) (per curiam); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 1B1.3, 1B1.4 (1998). However, Bill is certainly in no worse a position than he
was pre-Apprendi, even if he loses at sentencing. It has been suggested to us by Professor
George Fisher that the defendant's chances of winning on the aggravating fact after
Apprendi are actually lower than they were before the decision because the defendant has a
better chance before a judge than a jury. To be sure, conviction rates at bench trials are
lower than the rates at jury trials for some federal crimes. However, we cannot agree that
trial jurors-who are not permitted to hear government evidence excluded by the rules of
evidence (see, for example, the case of Westmoreland, described in note 24 infra), who are
bound to reject an aggravating element for any reasonable doubt and permitted to reject it for
any reason at all, and whose decisions to do so are unreviewable-would be more likely on
average to find an aggravating element than a sentencing judge. A sentencing judge is privy
to more of the government's proof, need only find the fact more likely than not, and must
make sure his decision to reject an aggravating fact will hold up on appeal.

300

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:295

not take Bill to trial on the higher offense in the first place, instead settling for a
plea on the lesser offense.2 2
Indeed, for proof that Apprendi can assist defendants in federal drug cases
we need not limit ourselves (as Professor Bibas does) to hypothetical cases.
We include in a footnote just a sampling of actual decisions in which reviewing
courts applying Apprendi have sometimes begrudgingly chopped ten years or
more from the sentences of defendants convicted of federal drug crimes.2 3

22. Resource and time constraints, on the part of the prosecutors, courts, and prison
systems, mean that prosecutors will offer approximately the same number of pleas, with
approximately the same discounts, after Apprendi as they did before. See, e.g., WAYNE LA
FAvE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1 (2d ed. 1999);
Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1043 (2001); William Stuntz, Plea
Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). Apprendi should make it more likely
that the steepest discounts will go to those actually innocent of the enhancements.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence
from life plus 120 years to no more than 30 years); United States v. Mauleon, 2001 WL
263092 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2001) (unpublished) (reducing sentence from 120 months to 5
years); United States v. Velasco-Heredia, 249 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing 60-month
sentence and remanding for new trial or resentencing at 37 to 46 months); United States v.
Yakle, 242 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence by 22 months); United States v. Ray,
250 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence from 97 months to 60 months, the statutory
maximum for the unenhanced marijuana crime); United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946 (7th
Cir. 2001) (remanding sentence for a reduction from 360 months to no more than 20 years);
United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence from life to
40 years); United States v. McWaine, 243 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2001) (reducing life sentence to
20 years); United States v. Murray, 248 F.3d 1153 (6th Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence from
25 to 20 years); United States v. Thomas, 246 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 2001) (remanding sentence
for reduction from life imprisonment to no more than 20 years); United States v. Covington,
2001 WL 302067 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2001) (unpublished) (reducing defendant's sentences
from 210 months and 120 months respectively to 5 years each); United States v. Longoria,
259 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (reducing sentence from 69 months to 60 months);
United States v. Lines, 2001 WL 329546 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001) (unpublished) (reducing
sentence from life imprisonment to 40 years); United States v. Vigneau, 248 F.3d 1128 (1st
Cir. 2001) (reducing sentence "well in excess of that maximum" to 5 years); United States v.
Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for a reduction from the 10 years
imposed to a sentence not to exceed the 5-year statutory maximum for the unenhanced
marijuana crime); United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 246 F.3d 676, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 38165 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished) (sentence reduced from 324 months to
20 years); United States v. Von Meshack, 225 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000) (vacating two life
sentences where statutory maximum was 30 years); United States v. Lewis, 230 F.3d 1355,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30940 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (unpublished) (finding that a 121
month sentence exceeded statutory maximum of 5 years); United States v. Murphy, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 1059 (D. Minn. 2000) (reducing sentence from 300 months to 240 months, the
statutory maximum for the unenhanced drug crime); United States v. Henderson, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 523 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (reducing life sentence to 240 months). These examples
do not include the many defendants who were erroneously sentenced above the statutory
maximum for the unenhanced drug offense, but who failed to overcome various barriers to
collateral relief, including non-retroactivity. For a full discussion of the procedural
impediments to correcting flawed judgments after Apprendi, see Nancy J. King & Susan R.
Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 331 (2000).

Nov. 2001 ]

PLEA BARGAINING

301

These cases, with dozens more reported weekly, tell the real story.24 Apprendi
raises the price of proving the larger drug quantity for the prosecution, and
some defendants will succeed in contesting allegations of larger quantities
despite the very high statutory maximum for the basic federal drug offense
simpliciter. As a result, these defendants will secure convictions to lesser
offenses through jury verdict or settlement. In fact, some felons convicted of
drug offenses may have their felony sentences reduced to misdemeanors.2 5
24. Though the cases we collect here all involve trials or pleas occurring before
Apprendi, the resulting lower sentences after successful Apprendi challenges are in many
cases likely to be the same lower sentences the defendant would receive today as a result of
the elements rule. Due to the rigors of harmless error and plain error analysis, relief in many
of these cases turned upon doubts about whether the record reflected proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the contested aggravator. See King & Klein, supra note 23 (discussing
review of Apprendi error under harmless error and plain error rules). For example, the trial
judge in Westmoreland, 240 F.3d at 963, determined that the defendant was responsible for
8.5 kilograms of cocaine, triggering a maximum life penalty, based upon co-conspirator
hearsay statements inadmissible at trial under the Confrontation Clause. In reversing the
sentence for plain error under Apprendi, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the only evidence of
drug quantity presented to the jury would have been the approximately 550.9 grams of
cocaine found in Westmoreland's car-a quantity allowing for a sentence of five- to fortyyears imprisonment ... ." Id. at 634. Thus, in the post-Apprendi world, Mr. Westmoreland
would not have been convicted of the greater offense, and would have benefited from
Apprendi's elements rule to the tune of 20 years. Likewise, the trial judge in Nordby, 225
F.3d at 1053, found that the defendant possessed 1000 or more marijuana plants, triggering
an increased statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment. However, the Ninth Circuit
reversed for plain error because the defendant presented sufficient evidence at trial and at
sentencing-that he was not responsible for most of the growing, that he withdrew from the
conspiracy in 1993, that the amount grown by co-conspirators was not foreseeable by him,
and that "guerilla gardeners" were growing on his land-such that the jury would not have
found this higher amount beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1060. Thus, in the world after
Apprendi, the prosecutor would have failed to convict of the aggravated offense, and the trial
judge would have been limited to a five-year sentence. In other cases, cited supra in note
23, the jury would not have found the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
sentencing judge would be limited by the correspondingly lower statutory maximum for the
unenhanced crime. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("The indictment specified quantities of drugs alleged to be involved in Counts 1 and 3, but
the verdict form asked only that the jury find 'detectable amount[s]' of marijuana, crack
cocaine, and phencyclidine ('PCP') in order to find defendants guilty. Therefore, it cannot
be found that the jury's convictions on those counts were based on any specific factual
findings as to drug quantity. It was only in connection with Count 2 (Continuing Criminal
Enterprise) that the verdict form required specific findings that defendants distributed 1.5
kilograms or more of crack cocaine and 3,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, and the jury
deadlocked on these issues."); United States v. Noble, 246 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
sentence 10 years above statutory maximum for unenhanced drug offense was plain error
under Apprendi because proof of drug quantity, while sufficient for a judicial finding at
sentencing by a preponderance of evidence, was not sufficiently strong that a rational jury
would have found at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants distributed 1000
kilograms or more of marijuana or its equivalent).
25. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2001) (increasing maximum sentence from 1
to 5 years based upon quantity of marijuana); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2001) (increasing
maximum penalty for simple possession from 1 to 20 years if substance contains cocaine
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Even if the greater drug amount could later be established at sentencing, judges
will not be able to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum for the
offense of conviction. 26
Moreover, by focusing only on Al and his hypothetical case, Professor
Bibas appears to be afflicted with federal drug myopia. Apprendi is not limited
to federal drug prosecutions. Forty percent of federal offenders are convicted
of drug-related offenses; sixty percent are sentenced for other crimes.2 7 Most
federal crimes do not have a twenty-year maximum absent proof of aggravating
facts. Many federal statutes increase a penalty from a misdemeanor to a three-,
five-, or twenty-year felony based upon aggravating facts such as value of
property, nature of the item possessed, mental state of the defendant, or injury
to the victim.2 8 Regardless of what the prosecutor attempts at sentencing, a
federal defendant is much better off after Apprendi if he succeeds in
challenging the aggravator.
Equally dramatically, many federal statutes
increase a relatively low sentence of three or five years, to higher sentences of
ten years, twenty years, or even the death penalty, based upon aggravators such
as injury or death to the victim, value of the bribe or item stolen, use of a
weapon, effect on the soundness of a financial institution, vulnerability of the
victim, or nature of the predicate act in a compound offense.2 9 After Apprendi,
base, from 1 to 3 years if substance possessed is flunitrazepam); United States v. Lowe, 143
F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (finding conspiracy to distribute marijuana conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 846 subject to maximum 1-year penalty rather than 5 years requested by
prosecutor, as jury did not find that marijuana was distributed for remuneration or that it was
more than small amount).
26. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (2000) (noting that relevant
conduct cannot be used to increase penalty beyond statutory maximum).
27. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics,
availableat http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm.
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 43(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 1
year to life imprisonment based upon bodily injury during crime of animal enterprise
terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 1 to 3
years based upon seriousness of assault upon federal officer); 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2001)
(increasing statutory maximum penalty from 1 to 5 years based upon bribe or gratuity
occurring willfully); 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum sentence from 1
year to the death penalty based upon finding of serious bodily injury or death occurring
during damage to religious property offense); 18 U.S.C. § 510 (2001) (increasing maximum
penalty from 1 to 10 years based upon checks forged having face value exceeding $1,000);
18 U.S.C. § 661 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 1 to 5 years based upon
value of property stolen within special maritime jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. § 1033 (2001)
(increasing statutory maximum penalty from 1 to 5 years based upon value of information
obtained by computer fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1791(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum
penalty from 6 months to 5, 10, or 20 years based upon nature of prohibited item possessed
by federal inmate).
29. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 5
to 20 years based upon unauthorized use of food stamps having face value in excess of
$5,000); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 5 years to
death based upon commercial gain and injury); 18 U.S.C. § 34 (2001) (increasing statutory
maximum penalty to life imprisonment or death penalty where crime results in death of any
person- 1994 amendment struck requirement that jury direct this sentence); 18 U.S.C §
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federal defendants actually innocent of these aggravating elements are in a
significantly better position; if they prevail at trial and are convicted of only the
lesser offense, nothing the prosecutor does at sentencing can raise the sentence
above the statutory maximum for that lesser offense. 30 Again, actual federal
111(b) (2001) (increasing 3-year statutory maximum penalty to 10 years based on use of a
deadly weapon or injury to the federal officer); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2001) (bribery;
increasing fine to three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value); 18 U.S.C. §
248(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from 3 to 10 years or life
imprisonment based upon serious bodily injury or death during course of violation of
freedom of access to clinic entrances act); 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2001) (increasing statutory
maximum penalty by additional 10 years if federal felony offense was committed while
participating in or to promote a criminal street gang); 18 U.S.C. § 653 (2001) (increasing
fine to amount of public funds embezzled); 18 U.S.C. § 1033 (2001) (increasing statutory
maximum penalty from 10 to 15 years based upon jeopardizing the soundness of an insurer);
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from life imprisonment to
death penalty if death results); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2001) (mail and wire fraud;
increasing statutory maximum penalty from 5 to 30 years based upon violation affecting a
financial institution); 18 U.S.C. § 1363 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty from
5 to 20 years based upon the building being a dwelling or a life being placed in jeopardy); 18
U.S.C. § 1503(b) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty for influencing juror or
obstructing justice from 10 to 20 years based upon the attempted killing of a petit juror, and
to the death penalty based upon killing a petit juror); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) (2001) (increasing
statutory maximum penalty from 10 years to the maximum penalty for the offense charged
in the proceeding hindered if the proceeding involved a criminal case); 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)
(2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty for commission of murder-for-hire from 10
years to life imprisonment if death results); 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2001) (increasing statutory
maximum penalty for violent crime in aid of racketeering activities from 3 years to death
penalty based upon use of weapon, injury to victim, death of victim); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
(2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty for RICO violation from 20 years to life if
"the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes
life imprisonment"); 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty for
interstate stalking from 3 years to life based on injury to victim); 18 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (2001)
(increasing statutory maximum penalty for interstate violation of protective order from 5 to
10 years if serious bodily injury to the victims result, 20 years if permanent disfigurement
results, or life imprisonment if the victim dies); 18 U.S.C. § 2326 (2001) (increasing
statutory maximum fraud penalty by additional 5 years based upon telemarketing, and
additional 10 years based upon victimizing at least 10 persons over age fifty-five); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332(b), (c) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty for acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries from 10 to 25 years based on damage to property, 30 years
based on serious bodily injury, 35 years for maiming, life imprisonment for kidnapping, and
the death sentence for killing); 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2001) (increasing statutory maximum
penalty from life imprisonment to death penalty if defendant engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise intentionally kills another or to avoid apprehension intentionally kills a
law enforcement officer); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2001) (increasing statutory maximum penalty
from 5 to 10 years based upon violation of currency reporting requirements while violating
another law or as part of a pattern of illegal activity); 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2001) (increasing
statutory maximum penalty from 5 to 10 years based on violation of the bank secrecy act as
part of a pattern of illegal activity).
30. The sole possible exception to our claim, and it is a significant exception, is the
potential for federal district judges in cases involving multiple counts to impose consecutive
sentences rather than allowing related sentences to run concurrently, as would ordinarily be
the case pursuant to the grouping provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
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defendants convicted of non-drug related offenses have received significant
sentencing reductions after Apprendi.3 1 Many of these defendants were
unwilling to plead guilty to the aggravating fact even before Apprendi's
elements rule. They will certainly not do so afterwards.
By focusing on federal drug offenders, Professor Bibas also overlooks the
vast majority of those who will be affected by Apprendi: felons prosecuted in
state courts. There are about one million felony filings per year at the state
level versus about 30,000 felony filings per year in federal district court.32 In
Appellate courts have split over whether the ability of the trial court to "stack" sentences in
this way provides a basis for upholding a sentence that would otherwise violate Apprendi.
Compare United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding sentence
reasoning that trial judge could have imposed sentence above statutory maximum on one
count by running multiple counts consecutively rather than concurrently), and United States
v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (same), and United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d
922 (7th Cir. 2001) (enhancing mail fraud sentence to 194 months based upon vulnerable
victim and crime committed while on release ordinarily must be reduced to 5-year statutory
maximum after Apprendi, but sentence saved by stacking sentence for interstate
transportation of stolen property with 10-year statutory maximum), with United States v.
Jones, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court cannot rely on
consecutive sentencing to avoid Apprendi). Of course many defendants face indictments
that do not contain multiple counts, and many defendants that do face multiple count
indictments will obtain significant sentence reductions after Apprendi despite stacking. See,
e.g., United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 255-56 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing
defendant's term of 240 months on both conspiracy and possession counts, to be served
concurrently, due to Apprendi error as the amount of marijuana was never submitted to the
jury and ordering that on remand, even if the district court opts to run the sentences on both
counts consecutively, the total resulting punishment is 10 years). In any case, defendants
who receive consecutive sentences equivalent to the sentence they would have received
before Apprendi are in no worse position than they were before Apprendi.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 2001 WL 759871 (11th Cir. 2001) (reducing
defendant Phom's sentence from 312 to no more than 240 months on remand where jury
failed to find him responsible beyond a reasonable doubt at trial for felony murder as
predicate act of RICO but judge found him responsible at sentencing by a preponderance of
evidence; reducing defendants Hoa Le and Ven Le's sentences from 364 months and life,
respectively, to no more than 240 months each on remand, as jury found them not guilty of
predicate acts with potential life sentences; reducing defendant Nguyen's sentence from life
to no more than 480 months on remand, as jury found him not guilty of predicate act with
potential life sentence, but this defendant found guilty of both substantive RICO offense and
conspiracy to commit RICO, potentially doubling his statutory maximum sentence of 20
years for each count); United States v. Pavelcik, 232 F.3d 898, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
32665 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (5-year consecutive enhancement under 18 U.S.C. §
2326 for fraud involving telemarketing vacated, sentence reduced from 111 months to 51
months); see also United States v. King, 246 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (71-month sentence
for mail fraud, above 5-year statutory maximum, remanded for resentencing and
determination as to applicability of Apprendi); United States v. Confredo, 242 F.3d 368,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 35712 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (Apprendi may require a "while
on release" enhancement to be submitted to a jury, sentence vacated and remanded); United
States v. Tinsley, 238 F.3d 418, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 709 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)
(vacating sentence for murder for hire and remanding in light of Apprendi); United States v.
Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1999) (enhancing penalty from 1 or 3 years to 10 years
based upon injury constitutes an element that must be found by the jury).
32. In 1996, 47,146 criminal cases were filed in the federal courts, of which slightly
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many states, prosecutors lack the degree of leverage provided in the federal
system by higher sentence ceilings, mandatory guidelines, mandatory minimum
sentences, and relaxed procedures for recidivism enhancements. Apprendi is
making a big difference, in ways favorable to defendants. For example, in
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and North Dakota district attorneys can no
longer boost sentences by waiting until sentencing to prove, by a mere
preponderance, facts such as sexual motivation, 33 exceptional brutality,34
future dangerousness, 35 vulnerability of the victim, 36 proximity to a school, 37
racial animus, 38 serious bodily injury, 39 or the use of a firearm. 40 Many of

over two-thirds were felonies. By contrast, in 1996, almost 998,000 felonies were filed in
the 50 states. See NORIvAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 13 (3d ed. 2000).

33. See, e.g., Grant v. State, 783 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a
judicial finding of sexual contact will not allow an 85-month sentence because this sentence
is above the statutory maximum for the unenhanced crime); State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d
394 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (decreasing the sentence from 40 to 30 years because the jury did
not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was motivated by sexual impulse).
34. See, e.g., People v. Nitz, 747 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reducing to 60 years a
life sentence for murder enhanced for exceptional brutality); State v. Lucas, 746 N.E.2d
1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reducing to 80 years an extended term of 120 years for attempted
murder and aggravated assault where the original sentence was based upon brutality).
35. See, e.g., People v. Wilder, 749 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reducing to 45
years an extended term of 60 years for murder so as to protect the public from further
criminal conduct); Clark v. State, 621 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 2001) (holding that a 5-year
consecutive enhancement for "especially dangerous" offender must go to the jury and
reducing the sentence from 15 to 10 years).
36. See, e.g., People v. Chanthaloth, 743 N.E.2d 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reducing to
30 years an extended term of 40 years for brutality to elderly and physically handicapped
victim because these factors were not submitted to the jury); People v. Coulter, 748 N.E.2d
240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that defendant's life sentence for murder of police officer
was valid, even though such sentences are ordinarily reduced to 40 years, because Apprendi
is not retroactive on collateral appeal); State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (holding that
consecutive 68-month sentences for two counts of child abuse based upon judicial finding of
excessive brutality, vulnerable victim, and fiduciary relationship must be reduced on remand
to no more than 34 months for each count because the statute permitting sentencing judge to
depart from the presumptive sentence based upon finding of aggravating fact by a
preponderance of evidence violated Apprendi).
37. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, No. CR-99-2648, 2001 WL 221437 (Ala. Crim. App.
Mar. 2, 2001) (holding that two consecutive 5-year enhancements for commission of crime
near a school and a housing project should be charged in indictment and submitted to a jury,
but that defendant in this case was not entitled to retroactive application of Apprendi on
collateral review).
38. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (racial-bias enhancement
potentially doubling 10-year maximum sentence, defendant's actual 12-year sentence
vacated); Brenan Schurr, Sentence Cut After Court Reverses Hate-Crimes Ruling, REC. N.
N.J., July 21, 2000, at A06 (reporting that Judge Rushdon H. Ridgway reduced Charles
Apprendi's sentence to 7 years because prosecutors "showed by [only] a 'preponderance of
the evidence' that Apprendi's act was racially motivated").
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these facts are not particularly easy to establish beyond a reasonable doubt. In
recognition of this increased burden of proof, courts have already reduced
numerous sentences by as much as half.4 1 A credible threat by a defendant to
contest an aggravating element may indeed produce a plea, but to the lesser
offense, not, as Professor Bibas would have us believe, to the aggravated one.
Prior to Apprendi, it may have made sense for a defendant guilty of the single
offense but innocent of the aggravator to plead guilty and try to head off the
longer sentence at sentencing. After Apprendi, innocent defendants will be in a
much better position to demand concessions. Divorced from the unique
attributes of Al's position (a prior offender facing federal drug charges from a
prosecutor who won't use prior convictions as leverage or insist on admissions
to sentence enhancements), Professor Bibas' statement that defendants "must
now surrender hearings on these issues with their guilty pleas, because they
plead guilty to every element of the offense" 42 is about as persuasive as saying
that an alleged rapist who lacked mens rea must plead guilty rather than contest
his mental state.
Admittedly, there is a category of cases where defendants might, in fact, be
"hurt" by Apprendi. Bibas' statement would only hold when defendants have
Al's unique attributes: a prior offender facing federal drug charges from a
prosecutor who will not use prior convictions as leverage or insist on
admissions to sentence enhancements. In other words, for this to happen, all of
the following must be true. First, the prosecutor must have had a trump card
such as a prior conviction which for some reason he was unwilling or unable to
use to leverage an admission to the aggravating feature as part of a plea
agreement. Second, the prosecutor must perceive the price of trial on the
aggravator to be so costly after Apprendi that he will now wield this threat to
try to avoid that trial, even though he would not have done so before Apprendi.

39. See, e.g., People v. Burns, No. 1-99-4030, 2001 WL 304090 (Ill App. Ct. June 28,
2001) (reducing to 40 years a 50-year sentence enhanced for serious bodily injury).
40. See, e.g., Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2001) (reducing defendant's
sentence from 35 to 25 years because the 10-year consecutive enhancement under California
law for a defendant who "personally used a firearm" was an element of the crime and not a
"sentencing factor"); State v. Shoats, 772 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.Div. 2001) (holding
that the No Early Release Act, requiring that defendant serve 85% of his sentence and be
subjected to automatic 5-year probation after sentence served, cannot be applied unless the
jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a weapon or the defendant
waives his right to a jury trial); People v. Rhodes, 723 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 2001) (holding
that the 5-year consecutive enhancement for display of weapon must go to jury, but refusing
to remand because the jury necessarily found the enhancing fact as part of the other two
charges); State v. Guice, 541 S.E.2d 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (reducing by 5 years a
sentence of 116 months enhanced for use of firearm because the original sentence exceeded
statutory maximum for kidnapping); State v. Santiago, No. CR 97514778, 2000 WL
1196686 (Conn. July 25, 2000) (requiring an additional 5-year term for use of firearm to be
modified on remand).
41. See cases cited in notes 33-40 supra.
42. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1158.
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Third, the prosecutor and the defendant must both believe they could win on
the aggravator at sentencing before a judge, so much so that they don't perceive
it in their best interest to include a stipulation as to that aggravator. Finally, the
prosecutor's evidence of the aggravator would have to be weak enough to
actually lose on this issue. We suspect that the quantity of cases in which all of
these stars align is not large. 43
Professor Bibas is also unconvincing when he criticizes Apprendi because
it "chops up crimes and creates more statutory maxima, which permits more
arbitrariness." 44 The arbitrariness results when prosecutors take advantage of
the opportunity to charge some defendants with lesser, some with higher
offenses, thus binding judicial discretion where before there was just one
charging option. For Professor Bibas, "[c]harge bargaining threatens to
undermine equal treatment." 45 Our objection to this point is two-fold. It is not
obvious to us that the choices of prosecutors and juries in selecting among
available charges are significantly more arbitrary than those of judges in
selecting sentences within broad penalty ranges.4 6 The striking trend of

43. There is another reason we believe that the number of defendants actually
disadvantaged by Apprendi is small. After Apprendi there is a method of litigating a
maximum-enhancing aggravator that is almost as "cheap" to the prosecution as the
sentencing hearing, and would allow defendants and prosecutors to closely replicate the preApprendi world. If a prosecutor after Apprendi is concerned about the cost of litigating the
aggravating fact as an element, and the defendant wants to obtain the advantages that would
flow from pleading guilty, the two sides can agree to a bench trial, on stipulated facts, except
for the aggravating fact. Cf United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, 110 F.3d 647, 653-56 (8th
Cir. 1997). The main difference between this process and a plea-plus-sentencing hearing is
the burden of proof by which the prosecutor must establish the aggravating fact. It is, in a
sense, a partial guilty plea, a plea to the lesser offense, with trial on only the aggravating
feature. See also United States v. Valesco-Heredia, 249 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing to
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 277 (1999)) (stating that district court judge, "in an
admirable display of attention and caution, allowed Velasco-Heredia to withdraw his guilty
plea in order to better preserve his argument for appeal). The parties proceeded with a bench
trial and submitted stipulated facts, whereby defendant admitted to 17 kilos of marijuana but
contested the 285 kilos which would trigger the enhanced sentence.
44. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1100.
45. Id. at 1168-69.
46. Curiously, Professor Bibas later raises the specter of judicial discretion as
something to avoid when he argues why too much process in sentencing is a problem. Id. at
1177-80. This claim is inconsistent with his mission of enhancing judicial discretion by
depriving prosecutors of the trump cards they can use in charging to set sentences. Later, he
bemoans the demise of legislative control over judges when he erroneously claims that
Apprendi will limit community-inspired sentencing rules enacted by legislatures but not
those undemocratic sentence rules created by an unelected sentencing commission. Id. at
1170-73. Not only is this concern with democracy in sentencing inconsistent with his vision
of judicial hegemony over sentencing, it is a misreading of Apprendi. Legislatures after
Apprendi remain in the driver's seat, free to control judicial discretion to set sentences
within statutory maxima as they please, to designate juries as sentencers, to abolish
sentencing commissions, or to raise sentence maxima so high-within constitutional limitsthat Apprendi's elements rule is never triggered.
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legislation limiting judicial discretion in the last forty years47 has, after all,
been motivated at least in part by the belief that judges were discriminating
among defendants unfairly. 48 This debatable claim aside, however, Professor
Bibas' lament about prosecutorial power has little to do with Apprendi. To
meaningfully limit charge bargaining, as Professor Bibas wishes, we would
have to abandon graded offenses, a great many of which have existed for
centuries.4 9 Aggravating elements that separate greater and lesser offenses
have long provided prosecutors and jurors the ability to distinguish the bad
from the worse. 50 The number of offenses already graded by aggravating
elements prior to Apprendi dwarfs the limited number of criminal statutes
whose sentence enhancements the Apprendi decision has transformed into
aggravating elements. Even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, state
legislatures began calibrating penalty to culpability by carving up what were
once single offenses into different degrees or levels of seriousness. 5 1 The
grading of criminal offenses was seen then, as now, as essential for advancing
the principles of utility and desert. As all first-year law students leam, grading
of offenses is designed to advance utilitarian goals by creating incentives for
offenders to avoid escalating their criminality, and to maintain proportionality
between penalty and offense.5 2 Apprendi did not establish this nation's

47. See generally WAYNE LA FAvE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 5 CRIMINAL

&

PROCEDURE at 734-35 § 26.3(b) (2d ed. 2000).
48. Our most recent sentencing reforms have been designed precisely to limit the
opportunities for discrimination and inequality presented by unguided judicial discretion.
See id.; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Even if one resolves this debate
about fairness in favor of judges, the argument that graded offenses increase prosecutorial
power is far from new. Professor Bibas joins a chorus of protests against the shift of power
to prosecutors occasioned by legislated limits on judicial discretion. See, e.g., KATE STITH
JOSE A. CABRANEs, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 141

(1999) (noting that "the exercise of broad prosecutorial authority over sentencing within a
system that severely limits the sentencing discretion offederaljudges means that the power
of prosecutors is not subject to the traditional checks and balances that help prevent abuse of
that power") (emphasis in original); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor 'Fixed' and 'Presumptive
Sentencing,' 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978); Susan R. Klein, DoubleJeopardy'sDemise, 99
CAL. L. REv. 1001 (2000) (arguing for judicially imposed limits on legislative and
prosecutorial charging and sentencing discretion through the double jeopardy clause);
Elizabeth T. Lear, CriminalLaw: Contemplatingthe Successive ProsecutionPhenomenon in
the FederalSystem, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 625 (1995) (suggesting that Congress
impose statutory limits on prosecutors).
49. King & Klein, supra note 3, at 1471-77.
50. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
51. See King & Klein, supra note 3, at nn.136-42 (describing movement to terms of
imprisonment in late 1700s). This shift came first, of course, with statutes dividing murder
into degrees. See also id. at nn.14-16 & 22-24 (describing graded offenses of the early
nineteenth century).
52. See, e.g., RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAw: PUNISHMENT AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA (2000). As one article noted recently, in

assessing the "best" and "worst" criminal codes of every American jurisdiction, a general
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preference for legislatures to select which features distinguish greater and
lesser offenses. Apprendi merely applied that norm, recognizing that whenever
a legislature has bothered to key its maximum sentences to particular
aggravating facts, those facts should continue to be treated as elements.
Our final points concern Professor Bibas' claims about the effects of
Apprendi on notice and prejudice to the defendant. 53 Continuing on his quest
to blame the perfectly sensible decision in Apprendi for much of what he
dislikes about criminal procedure generally, Professor Bibas declares that
Apprendi is "not tailored to give defendants the notice they need before they
plead guilty, namely notice of the maximum sentences they face." 5 4 To be
sure, it is conceivable that a defendant or attorney could draw the wrong
inference from a charging document about the maximum sentence at stake, but
defendants and their attorneys are much more likely to get that sentence
maximum right after the Apprendi decision than they were before Apprendi.
Aggravating factors triggering higher sentences were not even considered
elements that must be included in the charge before Apprendi. What the
decision does not do is ensure notice of prior offender status and its consequent
penalties because the Court (for the time being) left Almendarez-Torres55
standing. Of course, this means not that the Court should have rejected the
elements rule in Apprendi, as Professor Bibas argues, but that it should have
extended it to prior offenses as well.
We doubt that Professor Bibas would welcome this logical extension of his
own argument about notice, however, because making prior offenses elements
would, in his view, unduly prejudice those defendants who did go to trial. For
Professor Bibas, allowing aggravating features to become elements is
needlessly prejudicial because of the supposed effect on the jury. 56 (It is
curious that he trots out the jury for this single point, given his disdain for
scholars who continue to consider the jury trial a relevant feature of the
criminal justice system.) What he overlooks is that defendants have been
weathering this difficulty for centuries. We have lived for two centuries in a
world where many aggravating facts (although not always prior offense status)

"grading structure" for offenses is considered "critical":
A grading scheme with only a few categories essentially delegates most of the grading task
to the sentencing judge... which undercuts uniformity in application and increases the
potential for abuse of discretion.... [A] system of grading categories can be said to have its
own practical value, for it forces the legislature to consider the relative seriousness of an
offense vis-a-vis other offenses .... [T]he code should recognize all appropriate aggravating
and mitigating conditions when specifying different "degrees" of an offense ....

Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (andFive Best)
American CriminalCodes, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 51-59 (2000).
53. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1139-42, 1173-74.
54. Id. at 1101.
55. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
56. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
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went to the jury, and that tradition is embedded in graded offenses in every
state. The claim of today's Alan that "I didn't deal, but if I did it was less than
50 grams" is no more prejudicial than the claim of yesterday's Alex that "I did
not steal, but if I did it was less than $50."57 Unfortunately for Professor
Bibas, the Constitution does not protect defendants from the consequences of
inconsistent defenses.
In Professor Bibas' "World of Guilty Pleas," the Constitution is rewritten.
The jury is irrelevant. A judge would provide process that is better than the
process jury trials provide; legislatures would enact only generic, ungraded
offense definitions, leaving no toe-holds for prosecutors to differentiate among
offenders, a task better left to judges. 58 To be sure, others before him have
argued that we have stuffed so much procedure into the jury trial process that
we have made it unattainable for either defense or prosecution. 59 But these
grumpy refrains are generally directed at resurrecting the jury trial in some
form; they do not approach the startling proposals advanced by Professor
Bibas, who seeks, it seems, to close the casket lid on Article III and the Sixth
Amendment, starting with overruling Apprendi. Surely there are many steps
courts and lawmakers could take to promote community input, combat
arbitrariness, provide more accuracy and notice, and reduce coercion in our
criminal justice system. But to abandon the decision in Apprendi would be to
run in the opposite direction.

57. King & Klein, supra note 3, at 1472, 1475 nn.14 & 22 (collecting early cases and
statutes where value was treated as an element).
58. Professor Bibas recognizes that, despite structural democratic constraints,
Apprendi can be evaded by legislatures, and there may be a need to control such legislative
action. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1136-39. The Apprendi Court noted that a legislature that
revised its state criminal code to increase all statutory maxima would be subject to additional
constitutional scrutiny. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 n.2, 490 n.16. We have previously
offered a multi-factor due process test to flesh out the shape of such constitutional
constraints on legislative attempts at evasion. King & Klein, supra note 3, at 1535-44. We
are pleased to see that Professor Bibas adopted our suggestion to require that any fact that
raises a misdemeanor to a felony be considered an element. Bibas supra note 1, at 1180-82.
Our test went much further, however, and also considered (1) the common-law definitions of
crime and punishment, (2) the blending of historically distinct crimes into one element, (3)
the proportionality between the punishment and the offense as submitted to the jury, (4) the
breadth of the penalty range specified for the offense by the legislature, and (5) the lack of
mens rea or voluntariness.
59. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CH. L. REv. 867, 874 (1994); John Langbein, Torture and
Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 3, 11 (1978); see also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
RelationshipBetween CriminalProcedureand CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).

